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Fracking affects a range of communities in different ways and thus requires a holistic 
approach to its policy formation. There are a multitude of reactions to fracking, and in this 
perspective article, we argue that all require representation. Whilst Spain, as a state with 
dominant central authority, has devolved some responsibilities the local level, these 
communities remain powerless in legislative terms. Nevertheless, various platforms, NGOs, 
and autonomous communities have expressed strong opposition to fracking and as a result 
have had a certain amount of success in halting the development of unconventional gas. 
Despite this progress in their activism, it is evident that public opinion requires more robust 
and complete representation. Labelling these movements as cases of NIMBYism seeks to 
detract legitimacy from their concerns. To achieve a representative and legitimate democratic 
outcome in relation to fracking governance in Spain, distributive and procedural deficiencies 
must be addressed. Local communities are more likely to feel the negative effects of fracking, 
and these concerns, instead of being labelled as selfish, are valid and require representation. 
This is an area of descriptive and normative research that has drawn attention to the value of 
local governance in multiple nations, but little social scientific work of any type has taken 
place in Spain. As Spain contemplates its fracking future, within its currently precarious 
political context, it would do well to learn from the regulatory and governmental failures in 
other jurisdictions and seek to develop a robust framework that solicits and accommodates 
the range of valid and informed perspectives held on this topic. There is some indication of 
movement in this direction; offering some optimism that such approaches could be 
systematised. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Much social science on the contentious process of hydraulic fracturing has explored public 
perceptions of the impacts associated with its potential and realised development (Boudet 
2019, Evensen 2018b, Sovacool 2014, Jacquet 2014). Regulation has also been examined, 
with this scholarship being both descriptive – reflecting on the ways in which, and often the 
governmental level at which, hydraulic fracturing is regulated (Davis 2014, Minor 2013, 
Warner and Shapiro 2013) – and prescriptive – mostly asserting that regulation within a 
given jurisdiction is not fit to purpose (Bomberg 2017, Briggle 2015, Cotton 2017, Evensen 
2018a, Rawlins 2013). Within this latter, normative, strand of research on regulation, we find 
studies of discursive framing used by members of the public to argue for certain types of 
regulation (Bomberg 2017, Cotton et al. 2014, Hilson 2015, Measham et al. 2016, van de 
Graaf et al. 2018). We also observe moral arguments for regulating hydraulic fracturing in a 
certain way (Clough 2018, Cotton 2017, de Melo-Martín et al. 2014, Evensen 2015, 2016, 
2017, Finkel et al. 2013, Fry et al. 2015).  
 
One of the moral arguments emerging increasingly frequently in scholarship on regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing is the need for meaningful involvement from the local level (e.g., people 
in a community, municipal governments, local planning boards) in contributing to the 
creation and implementation of regulation (Bomberg 2017, Briggle 2015, Church of England 
2016, Cotton 2017, Evensen 2018a). Particularly in the UK – where the central government 
(Parliament in Westminster) is increasingly centralising governance of hydraulic fracturing 
for England – media coverage, public discourse, and even members of parliament in the 
governing Conservative party from constituencies with shale gas resources, have vehemently 
pushed back against the decline of opportunities for local say in regulation (Bomberg, 
Evensen 2018a). The Anglican Church in England identified local voice as its leading 
consideration for whether regulation on fracking is theologically just and moral (Church of 
England 2016). 
 
Beyond the UK, other nations have also considered this question of local governance. It has 
played out on a state versus local level in the United States, with the New York State 
Supreme Court ruling in favour of local authority to govern development (Dokshin 2016, 
Simonelli 2014), whilst other states such as Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Texas have shown 
much more reticence to cede authority to municipal governments (Briggle 2015, Davis 2014, 
Fry et al. 2015, Mayer and Malin 2018, Minor 2013, Rawlins 2013, Warner and Shapiro 
2013). In Australia, we see similar differences arising at the state level, with New South 
Wales most welcoming of local governance (Luke et al. 2018).  
 
In the Netherlands, attempts to involve the broad public in governance backfired on the 
central government when the public critiqued being only asked how to regulate shale gas 
development, and not whether to allow it or not (Köhne and Rasch 2018, Metze 2018a, 
2018b). In Poland, similar to the UK, scholars have decried the systematic exclusion of 
certain populations, including local communities, from meaningful ability to influence 
decision making and have pointed to the need for and value of novel means of engagement 
(Lis 2018, Lis and Stasik 2017, 2018, Stasik 2018). South Africa has recently afforded far 
more governance capacity to local authorities after the lead regulator at the national level 
changed to the environment agency, which is friendlier to local governance (Atkinson 2018). 
  
In this perspective article, we contextualise the history and debate over governance of 
hydraulic fracturing in Spain – a nation in which little has been written about the social 
scientific aspects of this energy issue. Conflicts over the scale at which governance, in 
general, occurs are particularly heated and relevant in Spain (Matti et al. 2017, Zamorano 
2017). We use the foregoing descriptive and normative scholarship on local governance of 
hydraulic fracturing, along with arguments against simplified NIMBY dismissal of local 
opposition, to advocate for a policy shift to more localised governance of hydraulic fracturing 
in Spain. Because so little has entered the academic literature on shale gas development in 
Spain, we fist synthesise the background on governance and public perceptions. 
 
2. Attention to hydraulic fracturing in Spain 
 
Declared in 1978, Spain is a unitary state, with 17 autonomous communities that are 
composed of smaller municipalities. Most power is held at the central level; however, various 
functions are carried out at the regional level (Lin 2014). Regulation of gas and oil lies 
primarily in the authority of the central government; nevertheless, other policy areas that 
fracking raises, such as water quality, fall under the responsibility of autonomous 
communities (Buono et al., 2018). 
 
Under the Partido Popular (PP), a conservative party in power from 2011 until 2018, the 
Spanish government showed strong support for hydraulic fracturing. Motivation to explore 
fracking largely stems from concern to gain greater energy security for Spain (Costa et al. 
2017b, Lin, 2014). Indeed, Spain has a high dependency on international imports of natural 
gas; 97% of Spain’s natural gas is sourced internationally (Costa et al. 2017b). Moreover, 
Spain has one of the highest levels of fuel poverty in Europe (32%) (Paylor 2017). Hydraulic 
fracturing for domestic gas could offer a solution to this accentuated energy dependency; it 
has been estimated (by an industry report) that exploitation of shale gas could allow Spain to 
be independent of imports by 2030 and even become an exporter by the year 2050 (Deloitte 
and Aciep 2014).  
 
Beyond its desire to reduce reliance on imports, the state is also keen to create income and 
employment (Costa et al. 2017b). Fracking could offer Spain economic rewards (Lin 2014), 
appealing in the current economic crisis where unemployment is high, with 15.3% of the 
labour force unemployed in 2018 (OECD, 2019). Development of shale gas could create jobs 
and promote business opportunities (Munasib and Rickman, 2015). These desires are 
reflected in the words of the president of the Spanish Oil Exploration Association, Antonion 
Martín; “when we talk about exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Spain, we are 
talking about creating employment (and) wealth for the country and improving our 
commercial standing in the world” (Burgen 2014). 
 
To push for fracking, the PP (conservative) government took various legal moves to promote 
it. Subsurface resources are owned by the national government; thus, extraction requires 
authorisation from the state (Lin, 2015). Under the national Hydrocarbons Law, the national 
government has sole authority to extract resources (Lin, 2014). In 2013, to clarify confusion, 
the law was changed explicitly to include hydraulic fracturing. This enactment stated the 
requirement for an assessment of environmental impacts of fracking; however, it limited the 
review to six months (Lin, 2014, 1048). In an attempt to incentivise development of shale 
gas, a new law passed in 2015 called for financial compensation for property owners and 
municipalities affected by fracking activity. Moreover, the Spanish government under PP 
limited the exploration of other, renewable energy alternatives, which could reduce its 
dependency on imports. The government’s push for fracking occurred at the same time as the 
abolition of subsidies for renewable energies in Decree Law 1/2012 (Lopera-Pareja, 2015). 
 
Priorities at a local level differ substantially from PP’s motivations for development 
nationally. Concern for environmental and public health dominates. Shale gas development 
comes with serious environmental risks, potentially causing local water contamination, air 
pollution, chemical spills and at a global level, climate change (Costa et al. 2017a, Lin, 
2014). Many Spaniards are concerned about negative environmental and social 
impacts/effects of fracking, and, therefore, have expressed opposition. A survey, carried out 
by Costa et al. (2017b), targeted two populations: inhabitants of Spain and inhabitants of 
Burgos, a region where the most investigation permits had been granted. The results show 
that half of the general Spanish population, 50.2%, oppose shale gas extraction; this 
opposition increased to 70.8% in Burgos (Costa et al., 2017b). Lack of support or optimism 
for fracking is also reflected in Spanish media coverage, where the tone of the discourse on 
fracking has been largely pessimistic or neutral (Lopera Pareja et al., 2015).  
 
The government’s attitude to fracking, however, has changed notably since Mariano Rajoy, 
leader of the PP, lost a vote of confidence, following a corruption trial, in May/June 2018. 
The Partido Popular was forced out of power and Pedro Sanchez, leader of the Social-
Democratic Political Party (PSOE) took over as prime minister (Aronoff 2019). PSOE have 
shown greater willingness to phase out fossil fuels, outlining a Green New Deal, advocating 
ecological transition through the development of new technologies that are less polluting and 
the creation of a new green sector (Sauer 2019). After taking office, Teresa Ribera, minister 
for ecological transition, repealed an anti-solar levy, previously bought in by the PP. The 
Green New Deal would also ban fracking nationwide (Aronoff 2019); notably, this is part of 
environmental legislation and not necessarily targeted at addressing local concerns. 
Nevertheless, as outlined in their manifesto, the goal of the New Green Deal is to mobilise 
participation from civil society and local communities to create opportunities by de-
carbonising the economy. The PSOE certainly seems more open to listening to local 
concerns. The PSOE gained high percentages of votes in the April 2019 general election in 
coal mining regions after establishing a deal to close the industry, agreeing with trade unions 
to invest €220 into those regions to promote retraining and retirement plans (Sauer 2019).  
 
Despite signs of advances in favour of environmental goals and local representation, the 
political landscape in Spain remains fairly unstable. The PSOE were forced to call snap 
elections after the agreement allowing Sanchez to be prime minister fell apart over budget 
negotiations (Aronoff 2019). PSOE took 29% of the vote, a victory without a majority, and 
has since been unable to form working coalitions with other parties (González 2019, Sauer 
2019). Negotiations between PSOE and Podemos, a left-wing party, have been unsuccessful, 
full of mistrust and tension (Garcia Valdiva 2019). Without a deal by September 23rd 2019, a 
new election will have to be called, the fourth in four years (Vizoso and Barbero 2019). Some 
political analysis speculates that a new election could favour the established parties (PSOE 
and PP), which might make a coalition government still difficult to form, as PSOE’s 123 
seats in parliament is still far shy of the 176-seat majority (González 2019).  In essence, 
although movement against fracking and towards local voice has been manifest recently, 
there is little certainty in the future political direction in Spain. 
 
This essay will explore the conflict between the national and local level, commenting on the 
way in which, to some extent, local opposition to fracking has halted the exploration of 
fracking in Spain. Whilst it could be argued that in the years of the PP, local concerns were 
begrudgingly listened to, the PSOE shows stronger motivation to include local voices in 
debate. However, political instability in Spain means that there is no certainty that local 
voices will be heard; furthermore, PSOE’s short and politically-fraught time in power means 
that no systematic governance principles have emerged in terms of local governance and 
representation. Despite the lack of fracking in Spain, we propose a more robust means of 
local inclusion.   
 
 
2.1. Fight between local and national 
 
Diverging interests regarding fracking have played out in power struggles between the 
national and local level in Spain. Most power is held in the central government, but limited 
competencies are devolved to regional levels. Fracking affects a wide range of environmental 
issues; thus, like in areas of the United States and South Africa (see above) it is often unclear 
which level has the power to legislate on the matter. Whilst primary responsibility for the 
regulation of oil and gas is held by the state, other aspects of fracking fall under regional 
power, for example water quality (Buono et al. 2018). Indeed, allegations have been made 
that granting hydraulic fracturing permits infringes upon local water resource legislation 
(Costa et al. 2017b). Similarly, Briggle (2013) commented, from a perspective on fracking in 
the US, on the way in which fracking as energy policy is a state matter, but as a land policy it 
is a local matter. However, Spain’s new 2013 ‘Hydrocarbons Law’ grants ultimate authority 
over processes associated with hydraulic fracturing to the state.  
 
Whilst at a national level the conservative party, Partido Popular (PP), has shown strong 
support for fracking, the story differs at the local level, with many PP politicians expressing 
disapproval (Lin, 2014) – a situation akin to the UK Tory members of parliament opposing 
shale gas development who live in constituencies with resources. In several regional 
assemblies, Cantabria and the Basque country included, PP politicians supported anti- 
fracking laws (Planelles, 2017). This bifurcation reveals a high level of confrontation 
between regional and national party politics (Lopera-Pareja et al. 2017).  
 
Various municipalities have attempted to ban fracking. In 2013, three regions in Spain, La 
Rioja, Navarra, and Cantabria adopted laws to ban hydraulic fracturing; however, in 2014, 
these were annulled by the State, which claimed that the autonomous communities had 
outstepped their responsibilities. Spain rested on the position that energy planning is a matter 
of state policy (Planelles 2018). Similarly, when both the Basque country and Cataluña 
passed various laws to make hydraulic fracturing unviable, the constitutional court too 
rejected these attempts (Planelles 2018). This trend is common across Europe; Cotton (2017) 
clearly delineates the ways in which the UK Government too has over-ridden local 
community decisions on shale gas extraction. 
 
2.2. Success of activism in Spain  
 
Whilst the Spanish state wields great power over hydraulic fracturing policy, it has not been 
straightforward to implement shale gas development. As mentioned, the conservative PP 
Spanish government was met with notable opposition from the local level. Strong anti-
fracking movements, intensifying from 2013 onwards, have had success at halting 
development in Spain (Herranz de la Casa et al. 2018). Van de Graaf et al. (2018), in a study 
of study of sixteen European nations including Spain, found that public opinion is vital in 
explaining regulatory bans. With regards to Spain, Planelles (2017) argues that, a group of 
five companies called Shale Gas España, involved in pro-fracking lobbying, ‘have given up 
on fracking altogether’.  
 
Growing activism against fracking has taken two forms in Spain: (1) local movements in the 
form of platforms against fracking and (2) campaigns led by national NGOs. Whilst NGO’s 
tend to be general in their objectives and have higher levels of institutionalisation, local 
antifracking platforms are more sporadic and more embedded in local opinion and concern 
(Herranz de la Casa et al. 2018). Whilst local communities stress the damaging and visible 
effects of fracking at a local level, international NGO’s tend to focus on the way in which 
developing fracking will hinder the development of renewable energy and will contribute to 
the already pressing issue of global climate change (Lewiński 2016). Both have played a key 
role in the fight to prevent fracking in Spain (Herranz de la Casa et al. 2018). An example of 
a success story for activism is that opposition in Ibiza has created a united front against 
fracking across the entire political spectrum (Burgen 2014).  
 
Citizen platforms have been powerful enough to motivate regional governments to support 
their demands (Herranz de la Casa et al. 2018). Due to a local initiative that collected over 
100,000 signatures, the Basque country passed legislation that places high environmental 
demands on hydraulic fracturing procedures, making it an almost unviable option (Planelles 
2017). Whilst not an outright ban, this effectively bans hydraulic fracturing due to the 
inability to realistically and economically meet the demands of the regulation. The case of 
Spain reflects a trend occurring in other European countries; even with governments pushing 
strongly for fracking, opposition movements have been able to hinder development (Friends 
of the Earth Scotland 2017, Van de Graaf et al. 2018, Evensen 2018a). One outright success 
story for activism is found in France, where a ban on unconventional gas development came 
into place in 2011 following different scales of collective public action, and because 
opposition was not only rooted in local concern, but was a global critique (Chailleux et al, 
2018).  
 
However, it is important to recognise other factors that have halted shale gas development in 
Spain, notably economic reasons. Whilst we can attribute the practically ceased activity of 
fracking in Spain, in part, to the success of civic movement, the high costs of fracking have 
greatly limited its progress. A spokesperson for Hunosa, a coal mining company, part of a 
fracking project called Llábana, stated that the organisation has been forced to stop 
exploration of fracking due to its high costs. Moreover, more than half of the applications for 
permission to investigate fracking have been closed, a large proportion of these at the 
company level due to the lack of profitability of the activity and the long administrative 
processes (Sevillano, E. 2019). Thus, whilst there is minimal fracking activity in Spain and 
local movements have helped forefront the risks associated with the activity, there is no clear 
evidence that the government has listened to local concerns. In fact, under the PP, various 
aggressive moves were taken to ignore local opinion. We advocate stronger means of local 
level inclusion in policy formation.  
 
 
3. Regulation in Spain: Advocating for local governance  
 
The environmental concerns associated with shale gas development show how difficult it is 
to manage juristically (Lin, 2014, 1064). To allow democratic establishment of energy 
policies, all interests must be represented and all concerns addressed. The importance of 
public opinion and local level knowledge is being increasingly acknowledged (Costa et al. 
2017b). Political leaders are influenced by public opinion, and in turn, public perspectives 
guide policy choices (Van de Graaf et al. 2018). This was manifest very concretely when 
PSOE achieved huge gains in the April 2019 vote share in mining regions by listening to 
local concerns and representing them in its party manifesto. Whilst regional-level 
administration has certain responsibilities in Spain, their veto power is greatly limited. Lin 
(2014) validly questions the appropriateness of policymaking processes in Spain. Despite the 
PSOE’s recent policy statements, little has actually changed in legislative terms in relation to 
local representation in decision making.  Furthermore, PSOE’s proposed ban on fracking, 
whilst it would negate the need for a conversation about representation of local concerns, still 
does not address the larger issue of local governance in siting and build-out of extractive 
industries. 
 
A key critique of opponents to fracking, not in relation to Spain specifically but generally 
across all areas where fracking occurs, is that these detractors are motivated by NIMBY 
concerns (Christopherson and Rightor 2014). Both Herranz de la Casa et al. (2018) and Costa 
et al. (2017b) connect the NIMBY critique to activism in Spain. Not in My Back Yard 
(NIMBY) is a pejorative term that describes local rejection of unwanted land use (Neville 
and Weinthal 2016). It describes rejection of the siting of a project, not the project itself, and 
thus manifests as opposition to the impacts of the development on the local community 
(Neville and Weinthal 2016). Anti-fracking movements have often been labelled as NIMBY 
(Christopherson and Rightor 2014, Devine-Wright 2013). From this perspective, opposition 
is a selfish act and detrimental to national interest. It is claimed that those who oppose are 
only objecting to the siting of the project, that their only concern is for the environmental and 
public health effects on their local community (Cotton 2013). However, the appropriateness 
of NIMBYism has been questioned by academics, due to its immediate dismissal of concerns 
as invalid and its failure to recognise underlying rationales for local opposition. Academics 
have criticised the NIMBY concept as being both unwarranted and unhelpful (DevineWright, 
2013; Cotton, 2013). It is largely project developers who employ the term NIMBY, as a 
means of undermining opposition (Cotton 2013). We argue that dismissing these movements 
as NIMBY both fails to consider the reasons for concern and ignores the relevance of local 
residents’ knowledge in policymaking processes.  
 
3.1. Participatory and distributive justice  
 
Public acceptance plays a key role in developing energy technologies; negative public 
opinion can halt projects. Public trust and political legitimacy could be enhanced through 
participatory decision-making procedures (Devine-Wright, 2013). Dismissing local 
campaigns as NIMBYism fails to give the public a voice, which, in many cases, is exactly 
what they are fighting for. Indeed, rejection of fracking is deeply rooted in a desire to have 
control over local communities (Cotton 2013, 2017). Briggle (2013) states that ‘it is not so 
much about saying no to fracking but simply having an opinion’. Lin (2014) argues that there 
are strong reasons to question whether the policy making process in Spain is suited to 
accounting for local and regional concerns. Interestingly, Bomberg (2017) attributes part of 
the success of the anti-shale coalition in the UK to the expansion of the debate beyond 
environmental concerns, by raising issues of local power and democracy (see also Evensen 
2018a).  
 
Therefore, as Costa et al. (2017b, 551) argue, ‘shale gas development in Europe calls for new 
strategies for risk analysis and governance in which public perception is an important factor 
to support the beginning of operations’. Participatory justice, defined as ‘institutional and 
procedural norms that guarantee all people equal opportunity for consideration in decision‐
making’ (Shrader-Frechette, 2002, 7) is necessary to address imbalances of power. A 
democratic policy process needs to be transparent, offering the public greater access to 
knowledge and allowing greater involvement in decision making procedures, with a focus on 
‘re-localising’ (Cotton 2017).  
 
Some approaches to institutionalising such engagement, as a means to move beyond the 
PSOE’s current useful but ad hoc acknowledgement of local concerns, can be found in 
literature on participation and engagement in environmental decision making.  Foundational 
research by Chess and Purcell (1999) establishes that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, 
and that multiple approaches to inclusive governance can be effective in representing local 
voices.  Webler and Tuler (2006) also acknowledge this diversity of mechanisms for 
inclusion whilst identifying some broad maxims: reaching all stakeholders, open information 
sharing, meaningful engagement, and incorporation of multiple perspectives.   
 
Chilvers and Kearnes (2015) caution the need to recognise that different ‘publics’ exist and 
that not all with be reached through the same mechanism of engagement (e.g., survey, focus 
group, consultation response, town hall meetings, etc.).  They also assert that some forms of 
participation, such as protest, that might not be readily thought of as formal participation in 
decision making, should be accounted for as meaningful engagement and expression of 
stakeholder views (Chilvers and Kearnes 2015).  Reed et al. (2018) point to the express need 
to be aware of power dynamics manifest in the sphere of engagement and to start with an 
explicit account of the values and epistemologies (i.e., perspectives on what counts as valid 
knowledge) held by the various parties.  Renn (2015) offers a lucid assessment of varying 
approaches to structuring and organising public participation in risk governance based on a 
typology of degrees to which complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity are present in the 
problem being addressed. 
 
Scholars have highlighted the need for inclusivity of local concerns and consultation on 
fracking, specifically analysis of how different regions will be affected (Christopherson and 
Rightor, 2014, Neville and Weinthal 2016). Cotton (2013) argues for the need to make public 
engagement more institutionalised and defined, bringing more clarity to public involvement 
and providing legal rights. Similarly, Evensen and Stedman (2016, 20), with reference to 
fracking in the United States, recommend a “systematic investigation” of how populations in 
areas both proximate to and farther away from potential development will be affected, 
pointing to clear differences in how shale gas development is perceived across the areas.  
 
The prospect of fracking also raises questions of the uneven distribution of the benefits and 
drawbacks. Cotton (2017) highlights the need for distributive justice, defined as ‘morally 
proper apportionment of benefits and burdens’ (Shrader-Frechette 2002, 3). Fracking affected 
communities may be economically marginalised due to the social and environmental 
repercussions (Cotton 2017). Indeed, the local level is more likely to withstand the worst 
negative effects of fracking (Jacquet 2014), whilst the benefits, such as of energy security, are 
gained at a national level (Van de Graaf et al. 2018). The national government in Spain owns 
subsurface resources; it is at this level that financial gain also would be made (Lin 2014). It is 
essential, for example, that policy planning considers the detrimental effects that fracking 
could have on tourism at a local level, as it is an industry on which Spain relies heavily. 
Therefore, concern over distributive justice calls for greater emphasis placed on the local 
voice in decision-making (Evensen, 2016, 2018b). Lastly, distributive fairness, like 
participatory fairness, also influences public acceptance (Clough 2018, Evensen 2015, Fry et 
al. 2015). 
 
3.2. Legitimacy of local perspectives  
 
Another rationale to increase local-level voice is because of the unique knowledge held at 
this level (Devine-Wright 2009). Local opinion is likely to be more defined on the matter; 
this is reflected in the study reported by Costa et al. (2017b). In their survey of the general 
population of Spain, 38% of respondents did not express opinion on whether fracking should 
be allowed, however, in Burgos, opinion was more defined, and rejection was markedly 
higher. Construal-level theory may help explain the way in which proximity and knowledge 
seem to positively correlate; those who are closer to the exploration sites perceive closer 
connection to shale gas development spatially, socially, and temporally, due to the fact that 
more information and experiences associated with development are available at a regional 
level (Clarke et al. 2016, Costa et al. 2017b, Craig et al. 2019, Evensen and Stedman 2016, 
Zanocco et al. 2019). For Costa et al. (2017b), the Spanish national versus regional data show 
a growing need to understand, and give relevance to, public attitudes to fracking.  
 
Cotton (2013, 2017) furthers the ethical critique of increasingly centralised governance by 
describing how it is unethical to subject people to the risks of fracking without full, informed 
consent without coercion. In a similar vein, multiple scholars have recently pointed to the 
need to look beyond physical and material impacts of shale gas development to impacts on 
human well-being and human flourishing (Evensen and Stedman 2018, Hirsch et al. 2018, 
Willow 2016). Evensen and Stedman (2018) suggest that policy makers should consider the 
meaning of well-being in different communities when evaluating fracking projects, calling 
for the recognition of more nuanced, abstract social impacts, beyond simply economic and 
environmental effects. Likewise, Devine-Wright offers a framework, through the lens of 
place attachment, which also criticises the pejorative term NIMBY and contradicts claims 
that public opposition is irrational or ignorant. Place-attachment, defined as ‘both the process 
of attaching oneself to a place and a product of this process’ (Devine-Wright, 2009, 427) can 
help explain local reactions to fracking and offers an analysis that justifies local reaction 
based on place-attachment (Davidson 2018, Evensen 2016, Griffiths 2019, Sangaramoorthy 
et al. 2016).  
 
3.3. Scaling up and global relevance, NIABY  
 
People who opposed shale gas development locally did not just want shale gas out of their 
community; they commonly did not want it anywhere. Seventy-one percent of respondents in 
the Burgos sample of the aforementioned Spain survey objected to fracking in the whole of 
Spain as well (Costa et al. 2017b). Moreover, the involvement of national Spanish 
nongovernmental organisations shows that concern is not just felt at a local level. Their focus 
has been to convince governments to look beyond the immediate benefits and consider spill 
over effects in terms of climate change. Thus, a democratic policy process must consider both 
short term and long-term costs and benefits (Griffiths 2019).  
 
A spokesperson for one NGO called Ecologistas en Acción called for ‘a change in energy 
model’ stating that ‘the way forward is not the extraction of gas; we can’t allow the continued 
burning of fossil fuels’ (Martín-Sosa, cited in Benitez, 2015). Including the multitude of 
voices in policy making processes will ensure that the full range of relevant considerations 
are at least brought to the table. Indeed, whilst there is strong anti-fracking discourses present 
in many European countries, governments still have the power to disregard these responses, 
as noted in the UK (Cotton 2017, Evensen 2018a, Hilson 2015).  
 
Research on NIMBYism has led to the exploration of the term ‘not-in-anyone’s-back yard’ 
(NIABY) (Lober and Green, 1994), used to explain how local movements, through various 
tools, scale up their campaign to a national or global level, see figure 1 (Neville and 
Weinthal, 2016 574). Therefore, local level campaigns are essential to develop wider 
movements. They may be ‘strategically used to drive broader, more encompassing activism 
and participation’ (Neville and Weinthal, 2016, 587). In a study carried out by Neville and 
Weinthal in Whitehorse, Yukon, local campaigners against liquid natural gas (LNG) 
continually bought the discussion back to global environmental concerns like climate change 
(Neville and Weinthal, 2016, 587). Similarly, Chailleux et al. (2018) show how combining 
different scales of anti-fracking discourse helped to pass a ban on unconventional shale gas 
development in 2011 in France. Furthermore, the comments made by the aforementioned 





Fracking effects a range of communities in different ways and thus requires a holistic 
approach to its policy formation. There are a multitude of reactions to fracking, and in this 
perspective article, we have argued that all require representation. Whilst Spain, as a state 
with dominant central authority, has devolved some responsibilities the local level, these 
communities remain powerless in legislative terms (Lin 2014), even at present with the more 
sympathetic policy approach of the PSOE (whose government may collapse at any time). 
Nevertheless, various platforms, NGOs, and autonomous communities have expressed strong 
opposition to fracking and as a result have had a certain amount of success in halting the 
development of unconventional gas. Despite this progress in their activism, it is evident that 
public opinion requires more robust, complete, and systematically guaranteed representation. 
Labelling these movements as cases of NIMBYism seeks to detract legitimacy from their 
concerns (Cotton 2013).  
 
To achieve a representative and legitimate democratic outcome in relation to fracking 
governance in Spain, distributive and procedural deficiencies must be addressed. Local 
communities are more likely to feel the negative effects of fracking, and these concerns, 
instead of being labelled as selfish, are valid and require representation. It is unfair to submit 
communities to an activity without obtaining informed consent, and also providing fora for 
consideration of the unique knowledge that these communities hold. As Spain contemplates 
its fracking future, it would do well to learn from the regulatory and governmental failures in 
other jurisdictions, such as the aforementioned ineffective approach to public consultation in 
the Netherlands (Köhne and Rasch 2018, Metze 2018a, 2018b) and the exclusion of relevant 
stakeholder groups in Poland from decision making processes (Lis 2018, Lis and Stasik 2017, 
2018, Stasik 2018).  In line with the previously cited literature on public participation and 
engagement, the Spanish Government should seek to develop a robust framework that solicits 
and accommodates the range of valid and informed perspectives held on this topic.  In PSOE 
remains in power, with a sole majority after new elections or in a coalition, we are optimistic 
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